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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
THE SCHOOL OF LAW
The Samuel Breckenridge Prize Awards for notes appearing
in Volume XIX of the Law Review have been announced by the
prize committee consisting of George W. Simpkins, Earl Susman
and Fred A. Eppenberger. The prizes for the best note appear-
ing in each of the four issues were awarded to: Herman Goralnik
for his note in the December, 1933 issue, Securities as Subjects
of Interstate Commerce; Harry Willmer Jones for his note in the
February, 1934 issue, The Interest Required of a Petitioner for
Receivership in Missouri; Sidney J. Murphy for his note in the
April, 1934 issue, The Extent of the Right of a Public Utility to
Refuse Service; Louis Clayton Larrabee for her note in the June
1934 issue, Publication as a Relinquishment of the Common Law
Right in Literary Property. Mr. Murphy won the additional
prize for the best note of the entire group.
Notes
SOME ASPECTS OF DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS
Under this title it is proposed to confine the discussion to situa-
tions in which the trustee has been given a discretion as to the
quantum of income or principal he may pay over to the benefici-
ary. Such discretions vary in degree; in general three classes
may be distinguished. (1) The most common category comprises
discretionary powers expressly qualified and subordinated to some
purpose of the settlor; such would include a discretion to pay
such sums as the trustee deems fit "for the comfortable support"
of the cestui;1 for "support and maintenance" ;2 for suitable edu-
cation;3 for necessary medical expenses ;4 or to convey the prin-
cipal "when he deems cestui able to manage it." At times the
IIn re Walters (1924) 278 Pa. 421, 123 Atl. 408; Cecil's Trustee v.
Robertson & Bro. (Ky. 1907) 105 S. W. 926; Ratliff's Ex'ers v. Common-
wealth (1907) 139 Ky. 533, 101 S. W. 978.
'Morris v. Daiker (1929) 35 Ohio App. 394, 172 N. E. 540; Coker v.
Coker (1922) 208 Ala. 354, 94 So. 566; Taylor v. Harwell (1880) 65 Ala. 1;
Gardner v. O'Loughlin (1912) 76 N. H. 481, 84 Atl. 935; Bronson v. Strause
(1889) 57 Conn. 147, 17 Atl. 699; Smith v. Wildman (1870) 37 Conn. 384;
Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Thompson (1916) 172 Ky. 350, 189
S. W. 245; Manning v. Sheehan (1911) 133 N. Y. Supp. 1006; Brooks v.
Reynolds (C. C. A. 6, 1893) 59 F. 923; Osborne v. Gordon (1893) 86 Wis.
92, 56 N. W. 334.
'Morris v. Daiker, supra note 2; In re Reith's Estate (1904) 144 Cal.
314, 77 Pac. 942; Mackenzie v. Los Angeles Trust Co. (1918) 39 Cal. App.
247, 178 Pac. 557.
'French v. Calkins (1911) 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. ]. 877.
'Meek v. Briggs (1893) 87 Iowa 610, 54 N. W. 456; Morris v. Daiker
supra note 2; Bacon v. Bacon (1882) 55 Vt. 243.
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trustee is not only given a discretion as to the quantum to be paid
over, but may also choose among several persons or purposes
designated by the trust instrument.6  The expressed guide often
becomes tenuously vague; as in the case of a discretion to pay
over principal if the trustee should "deem it to the interest" of
the cestui ;7 or to pay so much as considered "needful" ;8 or to use
a fund "entirely as they deem best for her."9  (2) Such border-
line situations adumbrate and are not easily distinguishable from
the second group in which no express boundaries are set up for
the trustee's guidance. This class stands midway between the
qualified and the so-called absolute discretions. In a leading case
the trustee was directed to pay income to the cestui "in such pro-
portions and in such manner as she (the trustee) herself may
decide."'1, The distinction between this and the preceding group
is rendered perilously slight by the fact that in most cases the
guiding purpose of the settler can be gleaned from the "four
corners" if not from the letter of the instrument. (3) The third
classification embraces the discretions variously known as pure,
unqualified, absolute or uncontrollable. In such cases the terms
of the trust instrument appear to free the trustee from any inter-
ference with the exercise of his discretion :-to use for the well-
being of the cestui "without any restrictions whatever";" "dis-
cretion shall not in any manner be interfered with by any
court" ;12 "sole and uncontrolled discretion without being liable
for the exercise of such discretion" ;13 "such payments to be at
all times at the sole and absolute discretion of the said trustee" ;14
are typical phrases. 5 It should be noted that these dispensing
'Hall v. Williams (1876) 120 Mass. 344 (to use income "in such way and
ways as shall be most likely to make the same enure and be beneficial to
such recipient's husband, wife or ---- children, or otherwise beneficial to
such recipient in the way of his or her education, or advancement, or sup-
port, exercising in all such cases ---- the judgment that would be expected
from a good father."); Hamilton v. Drago (1926) 241 N. Y. 401, 150 N. E.
496; Andrews v. Tuttle (1914) 45 Utah 98, 143 Pac. 124.
'Huntington v. Jones (1899) 72 Conn. 45, 43 Atl. 564; In re Clark (1915)
174 Iowa 449, 154 N. W. 759; Roosevelt v. Roosevelt (1875) 6 Hun 31; In
re Naglee's Estate (1866) 52 Pa. 154; and see Watling v. Watling (C. C. A.
6, 1928) 27 F. 2nd. 193.
•Rackeman v. Wood (1909) 203 Mass. 501, 89 N. E. 1037.
'Rinker's Adm'r. v. Simpson (1932) 159 Va. 612, 166 S. E. 546; see also
Jones v. Jones (1894) 30 N. Y. Supp. 177.
Carter v. Young (1927) 193 N. C. 678, 137 S. E. 875.
"Kiffner v. Kiffner (1919) 185 Iowa 1064, 171 N. W. 590.
'Raymond v. Tiffany (1908) 112 N. Y. Supp. 252.
"Hamilton v. Drago (1926) 241 N. Y. 401, 150 N. E. 496.
"Keyser v. Mitchell (1871) 67 Pa. 473.
"For others see In re Neil (1890) 62 L. T. (N. S.) 649; Angell v.
Angell (1908) 28 R. I. 592, 68 Atl. 583; Cromwell v. Converse (Conn. 1928)
143 Atl. 416; Keating v. Keating (1917) 182 Iowa 1056, 165 N. W. 74;
Mitchell v. Choctaw Bank (1914) 107 Miss. 314, 65 So. 278 (to control "as
if it were his own, absolutely, in fee simple, without any order of any
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss1/8
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clauses are frequently appended to the qualified discretions dis-
cussed under group one; so that we may be presented with an in-
strument which in one paragraph lays down standards and in the
next attempts to free the trustee from legal compulsion to act in
accordance with these standards.
There is a surprising dearth of material purporting to deal
with the discretionary trust per se. Too often has it been dis-
cussed merely as a branch of the orthodox spendthrift trust.10
This assimilation is the more dangerous because it contains germs
of truth; for neither in the discretionary nor in the spendthrift
trust can the cestui alienate his income before it is paid to him;
but the reason for this in the case of the discretionary trust is
that the amount to be paid over, if any, is indeterminate, and
hence the cestui has no title to any definite funds until the trustee
has exercised his discretion and made an allotment; whereas in
the conventional spendthrift trust the trustee has no such dis-
cretion, but must pay over definite sums, and the inalienability
results from an express provision by the settlor that the income
shall not be assigned or attached by creditors until it reaches the
cestui's hands. There is a tendency, especially in the mind of the
courts, to identify and confuse these separable concepts beyond
the demands of necessity or logic. One result of this confusion
has been, as will appear later, an inadequate treatment of the
cestui's creditor; for the problems placed before him by an award
of discretion to his debtor's trustee are different from those cre-
ated by a mere provision against alienability. Separate treat-
ment of the discretionary trust is needed to make this and other
distinctions clear.
THE RIGHTS OF THE BENEFICIARY
The focal point of the rights of a beneficiary of a discretionary
trust is his power to invoke the aid of equity to control the trustee
in the exercise of his discretion; for until such discretion has been
exercised he possesses no property in any of the trust funds.
At the outset we are met by an ubiquitous dictum that it is
possible to create a discretion which is absolute and uncontroll-
able by any court.'7 It is notable, however, that these dicta usu-
ally emanate from cases in which the creditor of the beneficiary
is the party plaintiff; and few cases can be found in which the
issue was squarely presented by the beneficiary himself. On the
contrary, the doctrine is opposed by the great weight of author-
court."); and consult Stein v. Safe Deposit Co. (1915) 127 Md. 206, 96 Atl.
349.
" See Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift
Trust (1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 63.
" Keyserv. Mitchell (1871) 67 Pa. 473; In re Neil (1890) 62 L. T. (N. S.)
649; Robertson v. Hatfield (1913) 240 Pa. 476, 87 Atl. 853; and see Haydel
v. Hurck (1880) 72 Mo. 253, overruling same case (1878) 5 Mo. App. 267.
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ity. Two reasons are given. Most courts avow a rule of inter-
pretation and declare a reluctance ever to read an intent on the
part of the settlor to give his trustee so sovereign a carte
blanche.18 Such an interpretation, however, becomes obviously
factitious in the face of express terms to the contrary. A broader
and more fundamental basis for the rule is found by courts which
declare an uncontrolled discretion impossible as an attempt to
oust equity of its jurisdiction over trusts. 9 Both policy and logic
would seem to accord with this reasoning.
Upon what ground will a discretion be controlled? It may be
broadly stated that in all cases the burden of proof rests upon
the cestui to show an "abuse" of discretion.20 Obviously it is im-
possible to subject to rigid categories the multifarious situations
in which "abuse" is found.21 Each case depends upon its own
peculiar facts. Certain general classifications can be indicated.
(1) Clearest proof of abuse results from a showing of "bad
faith," or an improper or dishonest motive. Absolute dishonesty
need not be shown. A gross failure to provide sufficient "sup-
port" has been characterized as dishonest, 22 especially if the
trustee has profited thereby. 2' To favor one beneficiary over an-
other for personal reasons has been held "bad faith."2 4 On the
other hand, where the trustee is empowered to convey the corpus
should he deem the cestui capable of managing it, his failure to
convey is not necessarily regarded as in "bad faith" merely be-
cause his children will profit as remaindermen should the cestui
die without issue.2 5 (2) Judicial interference to redress an "un-
"Coker v. Coker (1922) 208 Ala. 354, 94 So. 566; Angell v. Angell
(1908) 28 R. I. 592, 68 Atl. 583; McDonald v. McDonald (1890) 92 Ala. 537,
9 So. 195.
"In re Clark (1915) 174 Iowa 449, 154 N. W. 759; Keating v. Keating(1917) 182 Iowa 1056, 165 N. W. 74; Butler v. Badger (1914) 128 Minn.
99, 150 N. W. 233; 2 Perry on Trusts (7th ed. 1929) secs. 510 and 511a.
In re Cowen's Estate (1933) 265 N. Y. Supp. 40 ("Trustees have no
affirmative burden"); Leverett v. Barnwell (1913) 214 Mass. 105, 101 N. E.
75 ("clear proof").
" See Restatement of Trusts (Am. L. Inst. 1932) Sec. 181 (d) for sug-
gested criteria: "(1) the extent of the discretion intended to be conferred
upon the trustee by the terms of the trust; (2) the purpose of the trust; (3)
the nature of the power; (4) the existence or non-existence, the definiteness
or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness of the
trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of the trustee in exercising
or refraining from exercising the power; (6) the existence or non-existence
of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries."
' Callister v. Fassitt (1900) 163 N. Y. 281, 57 N. E. 490.
"McDonald v. McDonald (1891) 92 Ala. 537, 9 So. 195.
' Jones v. Jones (1894) 30 N. Y. Supp. 177 (Trustee disapproved of mar-
riage of disfavored cestui.).
" Turnure v. Turnure (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 197, at 200, 104 Atl. 293, at
295; In re Cowen's Estate (1933) 265 N. Y. Supp. 40. Where, however, the
trustee is instructed to divide among a class to which he himself belongs,
hp cannot distribute any portion to himself unless the settlor has expressly
permitted this. Andrews v. Tuttle (1914) 45 Utah 98, 143 Pac. 124.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss1/8
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reasonable or arbitrary" abuse of discretion includes a hetero-
geneous assortment of cases which defies any reduction to rules.
It is under the aegis of this phrase that the courts assert their
most frequent control over the trustee. "Reasonable" is to be
understood "in view of the nature and amount of the income,
the time when it becomes available to the trustee for the purposes
of distribution, and the circumstances of the beneficiaries." 20
Such definitions, however, add little; each case merits an in-
dividual consideration. 27 By a reasonable implication the needs of
the beneficiary have been held to include those of his family.271
(3) The intervention of equity will also be justified by a total
failure to exercise the given discretion. 28 The trustee need not,
however, make a separate exercise of his discretion every time
he pays over; the fact that a trustee in all subsequent payments
through a period of years had never varied the amount decided
upon for the first payment has been held not to constitute evi-
dence of a failure to exercise his discretion.20 (4) It has been
stated as a separate rule that a discretion will not be permitted
to be exercised in such a manner as to controvert the purpose of
'Angell v. Angell (1908) 28 R. I. 592, at p. 598, 68 Ati. 583, at p. 586;
and consult note 21.
' Eaton v. Loveren (1924) 81 N. H. 275, 125 AtI. 433, 35 A. L. R. 1034(The trustee must consider "the amount of money at his disposal, their
(cestuis') present as well as their probable future needs, their health and
capacity to help themselves, and then do what the ordinary Man would do
under similiar circumstances."); Gardner v. O'Loughlin (1912) 76 N. H.
481, 84 Atl. 935; Colton v. Colton (1888) 127 U. S. 300 at p. 321; Leverett
v. Barnwell (1913) 214 Mass. 105, 101 N. E. 75; Manning v. Sheehan (1911)
133 N. Y. Supp. 1006; In re Hilton (1916) 160 N. Y. Supp. 55; In re Van
Zandt's Will (1931) 247 N. Y. Supp. 441; In re Reith's Estate (1904) 144
Cal. 314, 77 Pac. 942; Russell v. Hartley (1910) 83 Conn. 654, 78 Atl. 320;
Keating v. Keating (1917) 182 Iowa 1056, 165 N. W. 74; Cecil's Trustee v.
Robertson & Bro. (Ky. 1907) 105 S. W. 926; Marshall's Trustee v. Rash
(1888) 87 Ky. 116, 7 S. W. 879; Read v. Patterson (1888) 44 N. J. Eq. 211,
14 Atl. 490. There is a conflict as to whether the trustee can favor one
beneficiary over another; holding this an arbitrary violation of the testator's
implied intent that members of a class should be favored equally, Jones v.
Jones (1894) 30 N. Y. Supp. 177; contra, sustaining such distinction if reas-
onably supported by a substantial difference in the circumstances of the
cestuis, Stephenson v. Norris (1906) 128 Wis. 242, 107 N. W. 343; and see
Trout v. Pratt (1907) 106 Va. 431, 56 S. E. 165.
" There is conflict as to whether the divorced wife of the cestui can com-
pel payment of her alimony out of the trust fund. If she is regarded as
no longer belonging to the family she is held a mere creditor and denied
remedy. Eaton v. Loveren, supra note 27; Kiffner v. Kiffner (1919) 185
Iowa 1064, 171 N. W. 590. Contra, treated as still a member of the family,
England v. England (1922) 223 Ill. App. 549; and see dictum in Wetmore
v. Wetmore (1896) 149 N. Y. 520, 44 N. E. 169. But the cestui's child,
although in the custody of its divorced mother, remains "in the family."
Eaton v. Eaton (1926) 82 N. H. 216, 132 At]. 10. Consult local statutes.
" Coker v. Coker (1922) 208 Ala. 354, 94 So. 566; Andrews v. Tuttle
(1914) 45 Utah 98, 143 Pac. 124; Wilson v. Turner (1883) 22 Ch. D. 521.
Cromwell v. Converse (Conn. 1928) 143 Atl. 416.
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the settlor.10 It is submitted that this is merely a statement of a
basic principle which underlies the tests outlined above; for "the
trustees are always under compulsion to carry out the testator's
main purpose as disclosed by the will, and their discretion always
must be subservient thereto ;-31 the rules of reasonableness, good
faith and diligent exercise of discretion are always guided by the
settlor's purpose.
Some authority has been advanced for the proposition that in
the cases either of an "unguided" or of an "absolute" discretion
equity cannot correct an unreasonable exercise and can only in-
tervene in case of "bad faith." The reason presented is that the
settlor has expressly unfettered the trustee's actions, or has laid
down no standard of rasonableness. 3 2 Although this rule appears
to have obtained in England, the majority of the American au-
thorities do not sustain it.3 The American decisions appear bet-
ter founded; for, as has been seen, in almost all cases the purpose
of the settlor can be ascertained from the "four corners" of the
trust instrument, and the intent that there be a reasonable com-
pliance with his desires can be interpreted to be impliedly pres-
ent.3 4 Furthermore, the power to compel a reasonable execution
of the trustee's discretion is always inherent in a court of equity
and cannot be nullified by a private fiat.3 5 It is possible that in
actual practice the courts may be less ready to find abuse of an
"absolute" discretion than in cases where an expressed standard
is squarely before their eyes. The difference, however, is of de-
gree only, and not of kind. It thus appears that the three varie-
ties of discretionary trusts receive essentially similar treatment.
This conclusion finds support not only in the dicta but also in the
actual results attained in the reported cases. Separate classifica-
tion is descriptively interesting, but not necessary.
Some confusion exists as to the proper decrees by which equity
can enforce its corrective supervision over abuse of discretion.
Three types of control may be utilized. (1) The court in less
"Murphy v. Delano (1901) 95 Me. 229, 49 AtI. 1053.
Plummer v. Brown (Roberts) (1916) 315 Mo. 627, at 659, 287 S. W.
316, at 327.
"Tabor v. Brooks (1878) 10 Ch, D. 273; Gisborne v. Gisborne (1877)
2 App. Cas. 300; and see dictum in Town of Sharon v. Simons (1857) 30
Vt. 458; and see dictum in Watling v. Watling (C. C. A. 6, 1928) 27 F (2d)
193, at 195 "Court ought not to overrule the trustee's discretion, except
upon the clearest of proof, that is, proof that it has not exercised a good
faith discretion." But as a matter of fact the court seems to imply that
"reasonable" would be a necessary ingredient of "good faith" -- "honest and
well intentioned discretion."
" Keating v. Keating (1917) 182 Iowa 1056, 165 N. W. 74; Rinker's
Adm'r. v. Simpson (1933) 159 Va. 612, 166 S. E. 546; Angell v. Angell
(1908) 28 R. I. 592, 68 Atl. 583; In re Naglee's Estate (1866) 52 Pa. 154
(Disregard incorrect head note!)
"In this connection consult notes 18 and 31.
Consult note 19.
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flagrant cases may content itself with ordering the trustee to
exercise his discretion in a proper manner, with the caveat that
in the event of his failure to do so the court will exercise the
power itself;36 for it is preferred not to usurp the trustee's dis-
cretion any farther than absolutely necessary. In their solici-
tude over the inviolability of discretion, however, the courts have
sometimes gone far toward creating a doctrine of "untouchabil-
ity"; and it has been said that the court may discharge a trustee
for unreasonable refusal to act, but cannot itself order him to
pay a definitely ascertained sum, or act in his place2 (2) The
majority view does not wait upon this technicality, but permits
the court, when its attention is called to an abuse, to determine
the precise sum which is reasonable, to order the trustee to pay
over this amount, and, if necessary, to execute the power itself. 8
A court of chancery will not permit the plain ends and
purposes of a discretionary trust to be defeated by the arbi-
trary exercise of their discretion by trustees, even though
to prevent it the court must substitute its discretion for that
of the trustee's.8
(3) Where the abuse is of suitable gravity the trustee is removed.
This measure usually, though not necessarily, is reserved to cases
involving "bad faith," refusal to act, or total perversion of the
trust.3 0
'Manning v. Sheehan (1911) 133 N. Y. Supp. 1006 (here "no culpable
failure to exercise discretion in a reasonable manner." The trustee merely
doubted his powers.) Such a mild remedy, of course, may be extended to
more serious abuses if the court desires. See Carter v. Young (1927) 193
N. C. 678, 137 S. E. 875.
"Eaton v. Eaton (1926) 82 N. Hl. 216, 132 At]. 10.
IEdward v. Edward (1925) 117 Kan. 458, 232 Pac. 240 (ordered trustee
to pay $150 per month) ; Watling v. Watling (C. C. A. 6, 1928) 27 F. (2d)
193; Callister v. Fassitt (1900) 163 N. Y. 281, 57 N. E. 490 (Court set
precise sum for trustee to pay); Gardner v. O'Loughlin (1912) 76 N. H.
481, 84 Atl. 935 (same); McDonald v. McDonald (1891) 92 Ala. 537, 9 So.
195 (same); In re Harrar's Estate (1914) 244 Pa. 542, 91 At]. 503; Coker
v. Coker (1922) 208 Ala. 354, 94 So. 566 (case of "perversion and abandon-
ment of trust"; court administered trust itself); Andrews v. Tuttle (1914)
45 Utah 98, 143 Pac. 124 (Court itself divided among the cestuis); Jones
v. Jones (1894) 30 N. Y. Supp. 177 (Court can remove trustee or compel
him to pay definitely ascertained sums).
',Rinker's Adm'r. v. Simpson (1932) 159 Va. 612 at 622, 166 S. E. 546,
at 550.
M artin v. McCune (1925) 318 Ill. 585, 149 N. E. 489; Keating v. Keat-
ing (1917) 182 Iowa 1056, 165 N. W. 74 (The trustee had continually main-
tained and acted on the assumption that his discretion was "absolute."
The trust instrument, indeed, had expressly exempted him from "any order
of court." The court not only declared him subject to its jurisdiction but
removed him because (for one reason) his claim of absolute discretion was
a "denial of the trust"--a far journey from the theory of "uncontrollable
discretion"!).
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No rigid rules constrain the use of these decrees; the courts
in applying remedies maintain a fluidity of treatment suited to
the variety of the individual problems presented.
THE RIGHTS OF THE CREDITOR OF THE BENEFICIARY
It is premised that the creditor of the beneficiary can have no
greater right against the trust funds than has the beneficiary
himself.4  In light of the general principle that "Equity allows
the creditor to avail himself of the interest of the cestui"4' 1 it
might be expected that the remedies available to the cestui would
be available likewise to his creditor. Since the cestui ordinarily
has no title to the trust funds until the trustee has exercised his
discretion to pay over, obviously his creditor's lien can attach
no earlier; but since the cestui can compel his trustee to exer-
cise a reasonable discretion in making payments, it would seem
on principle that, where the trustee has arbitrarily refused to
make payments and the cestui as a result has contracted neces-
sary debts, the creditor should be able to secure a court order
compelling the trustee to discharge such debts. Where dealing
with the creditor, however, the majority of the cases evince a
complete reversal of policy. It is here that dicta supporting the
uncontrollability of discretion abound. In few of the cases is the
question of abuse of discretion raised. In most the courts con-
tent themselves with repeating that since the cestui cannot force
the discretion of the trustee a fortiore his creditor cannot. 2 It
is expressly said, "The trustee's control, discretion and power of
disposition cannot be regulated or directed at the suit of credi-
tors."' 43 The clue to this attitude may be found in an early lead-
ing case on the subject of discretionary trusts:
To subject the income to execution at the suit of a creditor
would - - - - utterly defeat the intent of the testator in
creating it. We cannot but regard this form of trust to be
as effectual in guarding a trust and its income against the
prodigality of its beneficiary as would be a positive exclu-
sion of creditors in the will of the testator.44
"Hall v. Williams (1876) 120 Mass. 344; and consult cases cited infra,
note 42.
" Huntington v. Jones (1899) 72 Conn. 45 at p. 50, 43 Atl. 564 at p. 566
(Under the facts in this case the court found the trustees had been given
no discretion as to income, but had a duty to pay over all; the case thus
is not directly in point as a discretionary trust.)
' Keyser v. Mitchell (1871) 67 Pa. 473; Brooks v. Reynolds (C. C. A. 6,
1893) 59 F. 923; Parker v. Carpenter (1915) 77 N. H. 453, 92 Atl. 955;
Raymond v. Tiffany (1908) 112 N. Y. Supp. 252; Meyers v. Russell (1908)
112 N. Y. Supp. 520; Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Thompson (1916)
172 Ky. 350, 189 S. W. 245.
Everitt v. Haskins (1918) 102 Kan. 546; 171 Pac. 632 at 633.
" Keyser v. Mitchell (1871) 67 Pa. 473, at p. 477.
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So far as the creditor is concerned these trusts are interpreted
as spendthrift trusts. No express provision against alienation
is necessary; the very form of the trust is deemed indicative of
the settlor's intent, which the courts zealously seek to protect.4"
In doing so they make a blunt denial of remedy to the creditor.
In thus identifying the discretionary with the spendthrift trust
the courts fail to recognize that they are placing on the creditor
of the cestui of the discretionary trust a far greater burden than
that borne by the creditor of the pure spendthrift. For in the
latter case the-creditor at least can depend upon the cestui's ob-
taining definite payments in accord with the provisions of the
trust instrument, and can seek these in his debtor's hands when
paid over; whereas in the case of a discretionary trust he must
stand powerless against the trustee's refusal to disburse to the
beneficiary. Irrespective of the wisdom of encouraging spend-
thrift trusts it may be questioned whether such an absolute sub-
mission to the rules governing spendthrift trusts is either neces-
sary or in all cases actually in furtherance of the intent of the
settlor; for it is likely that the donor desired to exempt the fund
from extravagances rather than from reasonable debts contracted
as a result of an arbitrary withholding of payments on the part
of the trustee. In the early case of Pole v. Pietse " this issue was
squarely faced. The trustees had been directed to "use so much
of the income as they in their discretion should think proper for
the education and support" of the cestui; the proofs showed that
the cestui had passed his last months in sickness and want; the
trustees had paid over a mere fraction of the available income.
The doctor who had attended the cestui sued to collect for his
services from the accumulated trust fund. The court in allow-
ing recovery held that the trustee's discretion had not been
"fairly and reasonably" exercised; that, had the cestui himself
applied, the court would have compelled the trustee to pay the
bill; hence that the trustee would be ordered to pay at the suit
of the cestui's creditor.
It would seem that this treatment offers a logical and work-
able solution to our problem. The intent of the settlor to pre-
serve the trust fund from extravagances is fully protected; for
the creditor can recover no more than the amounts which the
cestui could have forced the trustee in the exercise of a reason-
able discretion to pay over; obviously the court will interpret
reasonable in light of the intent evinced by the trust instrument.
Furthermore the creditor is given a direct remedy; and, since
the courts do not hesitate to direct certain bills to be paid on the
eek v. Briggs (1893) 87 Iowa 616, 54 N. W. 456; Mitchell v. Choctaw
Bank (1914) 107 Miss. 314, 65 So. 278; Everitt v. Haskins, supra note 43;
Hall v. Williams. supra note 40.
(1883) 61 Md. 570.
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suit of the cestui,4 7 there should be no objection on principle to
the creditor's being able to tap the resources of the trust with-
out needless circuity of action. This view obtains some adher-
ents; it is deserving of more.
48
Another line of decisions, arising in jurisdictions in which re-
straints on alienation of trust funds are disfavored, seeks to
pierce the barrier of the discretionary trust through a scrutiny
of the time at which the cestui obtains a property interest in the
payments. In the leading English case of In re Nei 49 the income
was to be paid as the trustee "in uncontrolled discretion think
fit"; the cestui mortgaged his future income; the debt became
due, and the creditor notified the trustee, who, however, con-
tinued to pay to the cestui. It was held that, although the pay-
ments were discretionary, there came an infinitesimal moment
immediately before actual payment when in the "irrevocable
determination" of the trustee the money belonged to the bene-
ficiary and the creditor's rights attached. At this moment the
trustee had notice of the assignment to the plaintiff, and, since
in spite of this he paid over to the cestui, he was held personally
liable to the plaintiff for this misapplication of the funds.
The more recent case of Hamilton v. Drago50 commits the New
York courts to a similar view. Under a statute permitting a
creditor to secure an execution against ten percent of any trust
income "due and owing" the cestui, the plaintiff sought to attach
future income to be paid over by a trustee possessed of "sole and
uncontrollable discretion." Recognizing the power of the trustee
to vary or withhold his awards the court, in holding for the
plaintiff, said:
if it (the discretion) is exercised in favor of the (cestui),
then there is due him the whole or such part of the income
as the trustee may allot to him. After such allotment he
" Rinker's Adm'r. v. Simpson (1932) 159 Va. 612, 166 S. E. 546; Manning
v. Sheehan (1911) 133 N. Y. Supp. 1006; Gardner v. O'Loughlin (1912) 76
N. H. 481, 84 Atl. 935.
" Cecil's Trustee v. Robertson & Bro. (Ky. 1907) 105 S. W. 926 (The
Kentucky courts do not enforce restraints on alienation of trust incomes.
The creditor here, therefore, had only to deal with the discretionary aspects
of the trust, without the added problem of spendthrift implications.). See
also Marshall's Trustee v. Rash (1888) 87 Ky. 116, 7 S. W. 879; In re
Walters (1924) 278 Pa. 421, 123 AtI. 408 (Here the State, which was sup-
porting a lunatic cestui, recovered expenses from the trustee who had un-
reasonably refused to exercise his discretion to support the cestui.) ; Morris
v. Daiker (1929) 35 Ohio App. 394, 172 N. E. 540 (dictum).
(1890) 62 L. T. (N. S.) 649; see also In re Coleman (1888) 39 Ch.
443; Lord v. Bunn (1843) 2 Y. & C. C. C. 98, 63 Eng. Rep. 43.
(1926) 241 N. Y. 401, 150 N. E. 496. The case does not cite any
authorities; its genesis apparently is similar to that of Pallas Athene. See
also the dissenting openion in Kiffner v. Kiffner (1919) 185 Iowa 1064, at
1067, 171 N. W. 590, at 591.
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may compel its payment. At least for some appreciable
time, however brief, the award must precede the delivery
of the income he is to receive, and during that time the exe-
cution attaches.
The solution attempted by these courts has at least the virtue
of enabling the creditor to attach the fund before it reaches the
hands of the cestui; where proper notice is served the trustee
cannot pay it over to the beneficiary without rendering himself
liable to the creditor for such a misapplication. Considered as a
complete remedy, however, the rule is not without defects. Un-
der the New York statute permitting only ten percent of the al-
lotment to be attached the presence of an execution is not likely
to deter the trustee from making payments; but in a jurisdiction
which completely abolishes spendthrift restraints on alienation,
the trustee will be likely to be deterred from making payments
which automatically may belong in their entirety to the credi-
tor;"' nor will the cestui care to force the discretion of the
trustee in such a case. The creditor thus is left without any
active or satisfactory remedy and must wait upon the action of
the trustee or the beneficiary. An additional flaw has been found
in the reasoning that there may be a time before the handing
over of the funds when the title has vested in the cestui; it has
been pointed out that this would involve permitting the cestui
to recover from the trustee money alloted to him but not paid
over, whereas the established law permits the trustee to change
his mind at any time before actual payment.52 This difficulty,
however, may be solved by the consideration that the only con-
clusive proof that the trustee has made an "irrevocable deter-
mination" consists in the fact that he actually did pay over;
hence the "split second" doctrine probably will of necessity be
confined to situations like the present. The chief difficulty is,
as mentioned above, one of practicality.
It thus would appear that from one aspect the rule of Pole v.
Pietsch presents the more fundamental solution to the problem;
for, under it, the creditor need not wait for the cestui to act, but
is given an active remedy against a trustee who has unreason-
ably refused to advance funds to the cestui. This rule, of course,
does not cover the situation where the trustee has always made
reasonable payments, and whose discretion, therefore, cannot
be forced by either cestui or creditor. This is not a defect in
jurisdictions which enforce the settlor's intent to keep the trust
fund free from prodigality; for so long as the cestui himself has
received proper disbursements the purpose of the trust instru-
ment is fulfilled, and no further solicitude need be paid to the
1 Comment, 26 Col. L. Rev. 776.
= Supra note 51.
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creditor, who can wait and attach the funds in the hands of the
cestui. But in a forum which favors the rights of the creditor
above the desire of the settlor to restrict alienation, and which
accordingly wishes to give the creditor a lien on the funds before
they reach the cestui, it would be well to supplement the remedy
provided by Pole v. Pietsch with that of Hamilton v. Drago.
Where these remedies thus are used in conjunction the creditor
will be protected in both contingencies :-under the "split sec-
ond" rule he can attach the sum about to be paid over, and, under
the doctrine of Pole v. Pietsch, in the event that the trustee
should fail properly to exercise his discretion, he can go to court
to force reasonable payments to satisfy his claim.
These are not perfect solvents of the problem. Taking into
account the complex and often diametrically conflicting factors
of the settlor's intent, the public policy of the jurisdiction, the
discretion of the trustee, the claim of the cestui to present sup-
port and the claim of the creditor for a debt perhaps incurred
long before the creation of the trust, these two remedies, even
though used in conjunction, appear woefully incomplete. More
subtle and adequate methods may in time be devised. Meanwhile
these tools, however blunt, have been fashioned by the courts
and lie at hand; much can be done with these to extricate the
creditor from his present unsatisfactory position.
CHRISTIAN B. PEPER '35.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE PROVISIONS
UNDER THE NIRA
With the enactment of the NIRA there arose a great deal of
speculation as to how effective its provisions would be and the
extent to which the courts would enforce them. The purpose of
the Act as stated in the Declaration of Policy is to eliminate un-
fair competitive practices, reduce and relieve unemployment, im-
prove the standards of labor, and otherwise rehabilitate indus-
try.1 According to Senator Wagner the National Industrial Re-
covery Act has as its single objective the wide-spread and perma-
nent reemployment of workers at wages sufficient to secure com-
fort and decent living. Business may not compete by reducing
wages, by sweating labor, or by resorting to unfair practices.2
The purpose of this discussion is to show the extent to which the
courts have enforced minimum wage provisions under the NIRA.
The NIRA itself provides for several methods of enforcing the
'48 Stat. L. 196, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 701.
'Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance, May 22 to June 1, 1933,
p. 1 .
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